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Competition in Persuasion - Booth School of Business

[17:21 2/12/2016 ]RESTUD: The Review of Economic StudiesPage: 300 300 322 Review of Economic Studies (2017)84, 300 322 The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Review of Economic Studies access publication 18 October 2016 Competition in PersuasionMATTHEW GENTZKOWS tanford University and NBERandEMIR KAMENICAU niversity of ChicagoFirst version received September2012; final version accepted September2016 (Eds.)We study symmetric information games where a number of senders choose what information tocommunicate. We show that the impact of Competition on information revelation is ambiguous in identify a condition on the information environment ( set of signals available to each sender) thatis necessary and sufficient for equilibrium outcomes to be no less informative than the collusive outcome,regardless of preferences.

GENTZKOW & KAMENICA COMPETITION IN PERSUASION 301 for that firm’s drug. The firms maximize the number of consumers buying their drugs. We can represent this situation as the following normal form game:2 null reveal2 null.25,.25.40,.20 reveal1.20,.40.34,.34 This is a Prisoner’s Dilemma. Revealing information is beneficial for the firms ...

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