Example: marketing

Commander's Critical Information • Requirements …

AD-A264 509 Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR):Reality Versus Perception DIELECTMAY 1 9 1993A Monographby CMajor Michael R. BarefieldArmorSchool of Advanced Military StudiesUnited States Army Command and General Staff CollegeFort Leavenworth, KansasFirst Term AY 92-93 Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited93-11065 Form ApprovedREPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE OMB No 07040-088 Puf3lic meoortnq ourdcen for tfuI cotlevd n of Information % estimated to a-etaqe I hour or teworse. 4'mcuding the time lot rev, t tnructions. wartonrg eaxtsun data %urtcewgatheting an" maintaining the data needed. and corhaietnq and revw -n the collection 0? 'rntr"PatOrn 5nd 4o0 nnen $s r#aQr'Tn this buaen i ilimate I, any other t & ,we t I,,,%ollection of iformation, snciuding uJgestlons tor reducirng this ouroel to Wainhiqlon Heaciauariers 'Sercnh.

AD-A264 509 Commander's Critical Information • Requirements (CCIR): Reality Versus Perception DI ELECT MAY 1 9 1993 A Monograph by …

Tags:

  Information, Critical, Requirements, Commander, Circ, Commander s critical information requirements

Information

Domain:

Source:

Link to this page:

Please notify us if you found a problem with this document:

Other abuse

Transcription of Commander's Critical Information • Requirements …

1 AD-A264 509 Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR):Reality Versus Perception DIELECTMAY 1 9 1993A Monographby CMajor Michael R. BarefieldArmorSchool of Advanced Military StudiesUnited States Army Command and General Staff CollegeFort Leavenworth, KansasFirst Term AY 92-93 Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited93-11065 Form ApprovedREPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE OMB No 07040-088 Puf3lic meoortnq ourdcen for tfuI cotlevd n of Information % estimated to a-etaqe I hour or teworse. 4'mcuding the time lot rev, t tnructions. wartonrg eaxtsun data %urtcewgatheting an" maintaining the data needed. and corhaietnq and revw -n the collection 0? 'rntr"PatOrn 5nd 4o0 nnen $s r#aQr'Tn this buaen i ilimate I, any other t & ,we t I,,,%ollection of iformation, snciuding uJgestlons tor reducirng this ouroel to Wainhiqlon Heaciauariers 'Sercnh.

2 L)renorate fr0 nftoraion Opea(Ati0ns And " e ont. ij2, ief~rfwnDavis l$ Suite '204, Ariongton. VA 22202-4302. ari to the Offt(e of Manrage-ent and 8u oet Pmervcfks Red ivcon Projeclt (07V044 188). 'iast ,nqton, -I( low)1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 1 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED1992 MONOGRAPH4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERSCOMMANDER'S Critical Information Requirements (CCIR):REALITY VERSUS PERCEPTION6. AUTHOR(S)MAJOR MICHAEL R. BAREFIELD7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADORESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATIONSCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES REPORT NUMBERATTN: ATZL-SWVFORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027-6900(COMM) (913) 684-3437 AVN 552-34379. SPONSORING 'MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING MONITORINGAGENCY REPORT NUMBER11.)

3 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES12a. DISTRIBUTION/ AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODEAPPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)SEE ATTACHED14, SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF PAGESCCIR EEFI DECISION MAKING Information 55 PIR FFIR COUP D'OEIL COMMAND AND CONTROL 16. PRICE CODEDOCTRINE LEADERSHIP BOUNDED RATIONALITY17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACTOF REPORT OF THIS PAGE OF ABSTRACTUNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSLFIEU UNLIMITEDNSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev, 2-89)_____ v Ni t ?91 Commander's Critical InformationRequirements (CCIR):Reality Versus PerceptionA MonographbyMajor Michael R. BarefieldArmorSchool of Advanced Military StudiesUnited States Army Command and General Staff CollegeFort Leavenworth, KansasS~First Term AY 92-93 /Appove ro PulicRelease; Distribution is UnlimitedSCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIESMONOGRAPH APPROVALM ajor Michael R.

4 BarefieldTitle of Monograph: Commander's Requirements (CCIR):Reality Versus Perception?Approved by:Monograph DirectorLTC Douglas L. Tystad12 M Director, School ofL James R. McDonoh, MS Advanced MilitaryStudies_____ _____ __Dir ctor, GraduatePhilip J. Brookes, Degree Program Acces,n For-OTIC TABU rlinno 'rced 2 JuS|tfiCdt;C,;1 Acceptpd this d_ day of 992 "yD, iribu~ton IAvd ldbitit CodesSAvml~ ,j(jjIorDi-A SO dI1 AABSTRACTCOMMANDER'S Critical Information Requirements (CCIR):REALITY VERSUS PERCEPTION? by MAJ Michael , USA, 55 purpose of this monograph is to determine ifcurrent and emerging doctrine adequately defines anddescribes CCIR so that it can be a usable tool forfuture battle monograph first analyzes the doctrine forthe use and communication of CCIR found in Army field manuals.)

5 The monograph then examinesthe concept of "bounded rationality" and its effectupon the mind of the commander in determining , the monograph examines how recent commanders Army corps and divisions designated certainessential Information and the effect that technologyhad on their focus. Lastly, the monograph critiquesemerging doctrine using the specific lessons ofbounded rationality and monograph concludes that the development ofany doctrine is a dynamic process. Doctrine muststudy the lessons of the past and combine the lessonslearned with the capabilities of the future in adisciplined evolution. The emerging doctrine forCCIR is a start in the right direction. However, itis not 'et complete and is misleading in its call forcontrol of Information versus command of it.

6 Themonograph gives recommendations for use in correctingand refining the doctrine before distribution to of ContentsI. Introduction .. 1II. The Doctrine of CCIR .. 6 III. The Mind of the commander .. 9IV. Past Tactical Commanders' Developmentof CCIR ..20 LTG George S. Patton, Jr .. 20MG John S. Wood ..* .. * ..23 LTG Frederick M. Franks, Jr .. 27MG Thomas G. Rhame .. 29V. A Critique of Emerging Doctrine .. 33VI. Conclusion .. 43 Endnotes .. 45 Bibliography .. 52iiiINTRODUCTIONMany commanding generals only spend theirtime ..in making their troops march in astraight line, in seeing that they keeptheir proper distances, in answering ques-tions which their aides de camp come to ask,in sending them hither and thither, and inrunning about incessantly themselves.

7 Inshort, they try to do everything and, as aresult, do Saxe, My ReveriesModern technology has drastically altered theenvironment in which men prosecute war, therebycreating new or revised leadership challenges for the2tactical commander . This technology has increased theinformation available to the commander and decreased3the time available to him for decision making. As aresult, commanders as a rule have not learned how tolimit the Information fed to them. They do not knowhow to separate the Information Critical to missionaccomplishment from the volumes of the technological capabilities used incommand and control systems have increased theavailability of detailed Information , the humancapacity to assess the value of Information and make adecision has not evolved at the same rate.

8 The resultis that technological performance has outpaced decisionmaking , Information transmission and processingoccur faster, through multiple means, over any4distance, and despite any type of weather. Themachines and systems that do this look impressive, withcolorful lights and fascinating functions, However,they have been unable to establish a Critical path fora commander to follow through the volumes ofinformation that create a clear mental vision of thebattlefield and illuminate what is important to the history of warfare, great captainswere able to see the battle clearly, despite abundantinformation, the stress of combat, and a lack of moderntechnology. They used their mind to create a mentalpicture of the battle and to establish and discerninformati i important to that human mind has not changed very much overtime.

9 Perceptions, memories, and intuitive andanalytical skills determine the mind's character andcapabilities. Just as the human body has limits as toits physical endurance under the stress of labor, thehuman mind has cognitive limits as to what it canabsorb during the decision making process of is an optimum amount of Information that acommander's mind can comprehend before it is5overloaded. Once the volume of Information passesthat optimum amount, the mind decreases in itsdecision-making this limitation, the mind of the commandermust decide what specific Information will ensure2development and raintenance of a mental vision of thebattlefield. The Commander's mind is the tool thatallows him to draw upon that vision in any situation,mission, or environment.

10 Therefore, the commander mustraise himself above the volumes of detailed informationthat could be reported to him. His mind must identifyand obtain those few Critical pieces of informationthat will verify, modify, or change his mental visionof the the commander expresses his Information needsis termed Commander's Critical Information RequirementsiCCIR). CCIR communicate Information that thecommander needs and considers Critical to determining acourse of action. CCIR is a tool to ensure thatinformation transmitted to the commander is meaningfuland readily recognized as Critical to his mental visionof the objective of this monograph is to decide ifemerging doctrine adequately defines and describes CCIRso that it can be a usable toe'l for future battlecommanders.


Related search queries