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Cost Functions - UCLA Economics
• Suppose firm wishes to raise production – Can’t change capital stock – Hires more workers. – Capital/Labor balance no longer optimal. – High production costs. 35 Time Frames • In very short run, ... startup cost of (r 1 +r 2) is sunk. • Cost function is thus with c(r 1,r 2,0) = r 1 +r 2.
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