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Cost Functions - UCLA Economics
• Implicit costs include the opportunity cost of the entrepreneur and the capital used for production. 3 Economic Cost • The economic cost of any input is its opportunity cost: –the remuneration the input would receive in its best alternative employment. 4 Model • …
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Dominant Strategy Equilibrium - UCLA Economics
www.econ.ucla.eduPublic Good Problem Consider the following situation. There is a plan to build a bridge in some village with n residents. Each resident’s bene t from the bridge is v i 2[0;v]. But this information is private. The cost of building a bridge is C > 0, which must be equally shared. Resident i’s payo is v i C=n if a bridge is built and 0 if not.
Microeconomic Theory -1- Uncertainty - UCLA Econ
www.econ.ucla.eduMicroeconomic Theory-3- Uncertainty © John Riley October 20, 2016 revised
Microeconomic Theory -1- Consumers - UCLA Econ
www.econ.ucla.eduMicroeconomic Theory-3- Consumers © John Riley October 11, 2016
New Beginnings: An Introduction to Introductions - UCLA Econ
www.econ.ucla.eduAn Introduction to Introductions By Simon Board 1 3/9/2015 . Four questions 2 3/9/2015 1. What is the question you are trying to answer? 2. Why is this question important? 3. ... Establish a new …
Repeated Game - UCLA Econ
www.econ.ucla.eduRepeated game is a model about such long-term relationships. Obara (UCLA) Repeated Game March 1, 2012 2 / 33. Introduction A list of questions we are interested in: I When can people cooperate in a long-term relationship? I How do people cooperate? ... Repeated Game Ichiro Obara ...
Note on Afriat™s Theorem, Ichiro Obara, September 29, 2009
www.econ.ucla.eduNote on Afriat™s Theorem, Ichiro Obara, September 29, 2009 This note is based on Fostel, Scarf, and Todd (2004). Consider a –nite data set D =
John Riley minor corrections 25 July 2016
www.econ.ucla.edu2. Concave function of one variable 4 3. Concave function of more than one variable 7 4. Necessary and sufficient conditions for a maximum 10 5. When is a function concave 11 6. The gains to diversifying 15 7. Production plans and supporting …
Preference and Utility - UCLA Economics
www.econ.ucla.eduformulate the consumer problem as a constrained optimization problem: max x2X u(x) s:t:p x w; or equivalently, max x2B(p;w) u(x), which may be easily solved analytically or numerically. Obara (UCLA) Preference and Utility October 2, 2012 12 / 20
Nash Equilibrium - University of California, Los Angeles
www.econ.ucla.eduI Player 1’s best response against each of player 2’s strategy = red circle. I Player 2’s best response against each of player 1’s strategy = blue circle. I NE = (A,B),(B,A). Chicken Game 0, 0 4, 1 3, 3 AB 1, 4 A B Obara (UCLA) Nash Equilibrium January 11, 2012 9 / 31
Preferences and Utility - UCLA Economics
www.econ.ucla.edu1 The Foundation of Utility Functions 1.1 A Basic Representation Theorem Suppose an agent chooses from a set of goods X = fa;b;c;:::g. For example, one can think of these goods as difierent TV sets or cars. Given two goods, x and y, the agent weakly prefers x over y if x is at least as good as y. To
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