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CRISIS AND INTELLIGENCE: TWO CASE STUDIES

Approvedfor Release:2014/05/20 TetandIranCRISISANDINTELLIGENCE:TWO CASESTUDIES Allen can take ondifferentforms and result from variousdevelopments-asurpriseattack,theo utbreakof war, a coup,thecollapse of agovernment,increasinggrowthof aninsurgency,rampantdemonstrationsandrio ts, assassination of animportantpoliticalleader,massiveeconom icfailure,downingofaircraft,sinking orseizureof a ship, and so forth. A CRISIS candevelopsuddenlywithlittleor nowarning,it cangraduallydevelopovertimeandthensudden lyblow, oritcan be aheighteningof orsuddendevelopmentwithina crisisalreadyin ofintelligencepriorto a CRISIS is toeliminatesurprisebyalertingandwarningo f CRISIS is taking place, therole ofintelligenceis tokeepthepolicvmakersand crisismanagersinformedofwhatis going a widevarietyof wayspriorto andduringa CRISIS inwhichintelligenceis fed into 's (CIA)NationalIntelligenceDaily,theDepart mentofState's(BureauofIntelligenceand Research, INR)MorningSummary,andtheDefenseIntellig enceAgency's (DIA) ,read daily at theWhiteHouse and byothersat the top in the foreign affairs (SNIEs)

Approved for Release: 2014/05/20 Case Studies liberate key urban areas long enough to organize the population and lead a genuine rebellion against the Saigon regime-theoffensive dealt the US and

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Transcription of CRISIS AND INTELLIGENCE: TWO CASE STUDIES

1 Approvedfor Release:2014/05/20 TetandIranCRISISANDINTELLIGENCE:TWO CASESTUDIES Allen can take ondifferentforms and result from variousdevelopments-asurpriseattack,theo utbreakof war, a coup,thecollapse of agovernment,increasinggrowthof aninsurgency,rampantdemonstrationsandrio ts, assassination of animportantpoliticalleader,massiveeconom icfailure,downingofaircraft,sinking orseizureof a ship, and so forth. A CRISIS candevelopsuddenlywithlittleor nowarning,it cangraduallydevelopovertimeandthensudden lyblow, oritcan be aheighteningof orsuddendevelopmentwithina crisisalreadyin ofintelligencepriorto a CRISIS is toeliminatesurprisebyalertingandwarningo f CRISIS is taking place, therole ofintelligenceis tokeepthepolicvmakersand crisismanagersinformedofwhatis going a widevarietyof wayspriorto andduringa CRISIS inwhichintelligenceis fed into 's (CIA)NationalIntelligenceDaily,theDepart mentofState's(BureauofIntelligenceand Research, INR)MorningSummary,andtheDefenseIntellig enceAgency's (DIA) ,read daily at theWhiteHouse and byothersat the top in the foreign affairs (SNIEs)

2 ,briefingmemoranda,andwarningme~ ,Secretaryof State,SecretaryofDefense,andothertop advisers alsoreceivespecialbriefingmaterialsprovi deddaily to agreatsurge ofincomingmaterial-cables,intelligencere ports,newsitems-andproducesanacuteneedon thepartof thepolicvmakerstoknowquicklywhatis happeningandwhatmaybeaboutto take place. Inadditionto theregulardailyintelligencepublications, situationreportsareparticularlyuseful inmeetingthisurgentneed forinformationandanalysis. Inadditionto thesituationreportsandotherspecialmemora nda,therewouldbe-dependingon thetypeofcrisis-oralbriefingsusing maps,photographs, and itsproperuse bythepolicvmakersis criticaltothehandlingof a obstacles andbarrierswhichoftenlead tointelligenceand oftheBrookingsInstitute,in anarticleentitled"Analysis, War, and Decision: WhyIntelligenceFailuresareInevitable,"co mmentedthat"mostcrucialmistakeshave seldom beenmadebycollectorsof rawinformation,occasionallyby professionals whoproducefinishedanalyses,butmostoftenb y the decisionmakerswhoconsumetheproductof Adaptedfrom apresentationto theInternationalStudies Association,March1984, inAtlanta, Release:2014/05/20 Approvedfor Release:2014/05/19 CaseStudiesintelligenceservices.

3 Policypremisesconstrictperception, politicalandpsychologi-calmoreoftenthano rganizational."~Bettsandothershaveover the yearsobservedvarious reasons the cases I will be discussing, the mostsignificantfactors are:Policymakerstendtodisregardanalysisw hichrunscountertopreconceptions;thatis, ,some at the policyleveltendto placemoreweighton rawintelligencethanon analysis isparticularlythe case in a crisissituationwherebothdata lowandpolicyformulationoutpaceanalysis; thepolicyrnakersandcrisismanagersdevelop , asformerINRD irectorThomasHughesputit,"thesucculentta ste for the hotpoop."Somepolicymakershavea biasagainstintelligenceanalysts; they may not tosharevitalinformationwith be guilty ofmindset-tobeoverlycautiousandunwilling tochallengeeffectivelyconventionalwisdom ,to beambivalentand waffle. In such asituationtheanalystserveslittlepurposei n assisting thepolicymakersbyobjectivelyinformingher /himofwhatis going on and why, atendencyin the jointpreparationofestimates,suchasSNIEs, to resolvethroughconsensussubstantivediffer encesto a crisisofanexcessofinformation,muchof itfragmentaryandconflicting,makes it very difficult for ananalysttosort outwhatis realandunrealinorderto beabletomakeclearjudg-mentsas towhatis happeningandwhatitall to justifytheirownperformanceby to bepreoccupiedbyotheroftenequallysignifi- cantpolicymatters,or to besuddenlydistractedbyanothercrisissomew hereelse intheworld or right smack in themiddleof the kind ofsituationalso affects.

4 TetOffensiveinVietnam,1968On 30 January1968,duringTet,thelunarNew Year,nearly70,000communistsoldierslaunch eda surpriseoffensive ahundredSouthVietnamesecitiesandtowns,in cludingSaigon, thusshiftingthe war for the some days of fiercecombat,theenemywasclearedfrom most haveconcludedthattheysufferedapoliticald efeatbecausetheirmoreambitiousobjectives were notreached-to72 Approvedfor Release:2014/05/19.>Approvedfor Release:2014/05/20 CaseStudiesliberatekeyurbanareas longenoughtoorganizethepopulationand lead agenuinerebellionagainstthe Saigonregime-theoffensivedealttheUSandit s allies aseveresetbackbydemonstratingthecommunis ts'greatcapacitytolaunchmajorattacks'and to inflict had a majoradverseeffect on alliedconfidenceinultimatevictory,andit had a decisive effect intomotiontheeventualchangesin US policy theaftermathofTetfoundthatthe scope,intensity,coordination,andtimingof theattackswerenot fullyanticipated;thatthenatureof theattacks-againsturbanandnotruralareata rgets-hadnot beenpredicted;thatamajorunexpectedelemen thadbeenthecommunists'abilityto hit somanytargetssimultaneously.

5 Andthatcivilianandmilitaryleadershad been lulledintoafalse sense ofsecurity-basedon abelieffed by illusoryreportsoncommuniststrength,casua lties,infiltration,recruitment,andmorale -thatthecommu-nists'overallposition thetimingof thecommunists'offensive, most of theintelligenceanalystsconcludedthatthe offensive likely wouldoccurimmedi-atelypriorto or following theTetholidayperiodwhichextendedfrom27 Jan-uaryto analystsandcommanders,includingGeneralWe stmoreland,includedintheirestimatesthe possibilitythattheattacksmighttakeplaced uringtheholidaysandshiftedsome troops just in fall and into thewinterof 1967-68,therewas aconsiderableamountoffragmentaryevidence thatthecommunistswereplanninga majoroffensivearoundTeLThatfall thecommunistshad taken the offensiveinaseries of assaultsagainstalliedborderpositions and thenbeganthe siege at KheSanh on werebeingupgradedwithgreater,moremodernf irepower,andweredevelopinganimprovedcomm andandcontrolcapabilitythatwould allowthemtocoordinateoperationsbetweenre gularandguerrillaforces,aswell asbetweenheadquarters(includingbetweenHa noiandCOSVN) werecaughtoffguardnotbecausethey did notanticipatethe usualattacksin andaroundTet,but'probablybecausetheywere distractedormaybeevendeceivedbywhatwasha ppeningat Khe Sanhandelsewhereduringthis period.

6 At thetimethemilitarybelievedthatthecommuni stswereclosing in on Khe Sanh aspartof abroadstrategydesignedtoseizeandhold SouthVietnam' ,therewereindicationsthatthecommunistswe repreparingfor a series ofcoordinatedattackson alargerscalethanpreviouslyattemptedandth eintelligenceevenmentionedaspossibletarg etsmanyof the notsuggestthattheattacksmightconcentrate onurbantargets to thevirtualexclusion oftheruralareas, nor did the analystspredicttheextentof theattackswhichactuallyoccurredor thecommunists'abilitytoattacksimulta-neo usly to ,WashingtonandSaigon haddismissed the possibilitythatthecommunistsmightmakeago -for-brokegeneraloffensive, thus risking not onlytheirregulartroopsandtheirbestguerri llaforcesbuttheirpoliticalcadres, localmilitia,andunderground73 Approvedfor Release:2014/05/20 Approved for Release:2014/05/20 CaseStudiesadministrativeinfrastructurea s well.

7 ThejudgmentmadeinJanuary1968 wasthatthe offensive would be moreintensivebut followtraditionallines-attacksagainstmil itarybases, airfields,commandposts, outposts, pacifiedhamlets,andthatmostof the effort would beaimedat thenorthernmostprovinces(again thetrendwhichmanythoughtwasbeingset by the Khe Sanhsiege). Inthecase of asituationlikeVietnamwheresomepolicvmake rsandleadershavebeendeeplyinvolved in it for some time, the task ofintelligenceinattemptingto getthemtorecognizenew courses becomes 'capabilitieswas thecontroversybeginningin1967overthestre ngthof thecommunistforces. CIA, DIA, and INRconcludedthatthecommunistshad aninsurgencybase-regularsandmilitia-ofab out600,000, anumberwhichthensuggestedtotheanalyststh atthe war ofattritionwas not as successful aspreviouslythought,andthatthecommunists were able torecruit, ,however,supporteda figure of 300,000, thedifferencebeingthatSaigon did notacceptthedevelopmentof amilitiafromwhichnewcadreandregularscoul d ,those in Saigon could notacceptthe factthatthecommunistswere able by theintelligencecommunity,especiallyinWas hington,to resolve thedifferences,thematterremainedunresolv edand thuscontributedto a seriousmisreadingof thesituationon rawintelligencebeingreceivedonVietnam,mu chof itfragmentary,had asignificanteffect on theabilityof theintelligenceapparatus-inWashingtonand inVietnam-tosort out,analyze,andrespondin atimelyfashion.

8 Inaddition,theclutterofconflictingandcon -fusingreportsservedto dull the warnings. Many senior officials inWashingtonand Saigonfacedwith the necessity ofhavingto makepromptdecisionsoftenwereunableto wait for were in asituationwhichexceededtheircapabilityto absorb orscrutinizethe highvolumeofmaterialjudiciously,Thefinal elementwhichcontributedto thepolicvmakers'failureto givesufficient focus to theimpendingsituationon thegroundinVietnamwasWashington'spreoccu pationwiththePueblocrisis at the same of thePueblo,a USintelligenceship, a weekbeforeTetimmediatelyplungedmost of the foreign affairs anddefenseestablish-mentinto a CRISIS which raised thespectreof war on the Koreanpeninsulaandworriesover ,Washingtonwas at thetimealsodeeplyconcernedwithgrowingten sions in :TheIranianSituation,1977 1979 TheIraniancrisisculminatedin thedepartureof the Shah, thecomingtopowerof theAyatollahKhomeini,thetakingof the US hostages, the serioussetbackfor US interests, and thefurtherheighteningof tension inSouthwestAsia and theMiddleEast.

9 Mycommentson this CRISIS and the roleintelligenceplayedin itgenerallywill cover theperiodfrom late 1977 to theShah'sdepartureon 16 January1979, andKhomeini'sreturntoIranon for Release:2014/05/20 Approved for Release:2014/05/19 CaseStudiesDuringpreparationof aNationalIntelligenceEstimate(NIE) onIranin1975, theintelligencecommunityconcludedthatthe Shah'sregimewasinherentlyvulnerablebecau seit was not only rigidbutalsohighlyfragile-therewere noindependentinstitutionstosupportit, nolegitimatesuccessionprocedureto select viable survivors, and nomechanismto diffuse andreconcentratepowerandauthorityas the pressures of essenceconcludedthatshould theregimereceiveashock orcomeundersustainedpressure,it wouldprobablycollapse. But noone in thegroupthatpreparedthe NIE,andmembersof theacademiccommunitywho wereconsulted,couldhonestlyclaimlatertha the or thebreadthanddepthofanti-Shahsentiment-t hehiddenapathy,ambivalence, no one couldpredictwhatultimatelyhappened,there was awarningfailure.

10 Violentdemonstrationsand hostilitieseruptedin 1977 andmore so in 1978,placingtheregimeinjeopardyand with it thesubstantialUSinterestinIran'sstabilit y. Still, theattentionof toppolicvmakerswas notbroughtsufficiently tobearonIranuntilOctober1978. By then, therapidpaceofeventsandthedegreeofdissid encemadeorderlytransitionaway fromtheShah'srulenearlyimpossibleandpoli cyoptions whichmighthave existedearlierno longer held 1979 the HouseSubcommitteeonEvaluationof thePermanentSelectCommitteeonIntelligenc econcludedthatratherthanbeing simply anintelligencefailure,it was"afailureto which both theintelligencecommunityandthe users eachcarrypartof theblameforinsensitivitytodeep-rootedpro blemsin Iran. Moreimportantly,intelligenceand policy failingswereintertwined."Thesubcommittee madetwo basic findings. First,intelligencecollectionandanalysisw erejudgedto be aninadequateinformationbasewithwhichto gauge thecapabilityof the religiousoppositionandthebreadthofpopula roppositionandtopredictthatcertainevents would cometogethertodriveout the Shahandlead to a collapse of conclusion is substantialamountofaccurateinformationan danalysisaboutmajor events,particularlythedemonstrationsandr iots.


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