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Operational Culture for theWarfighter:Principles ...

OperationalCulturefortheWarfighterPrinci ples andApplicationsBarak A. SalmoniPaula Holmes-EberForeword byGeneral James N. Mattis, USMCO perationalCulturefortheWarfighter:Princi plesandApplicationsis a comprehensive textbook, reference, and planning tool. It ad-dresses the critical need of the Marine Corps to provide operationallyrelevant cultural teaching, training, and analysis. This book links so-cial science paradigms to the needs of Marines using an applied an-thropology text links fundamental features of Culture (environment, economy, social structure, political structure and be-lief systems) to the challenges of military operations in different cul-tures around the on the research and field experiences of Marines them-selves,OperationalCulturefortheWarf ighteruses case studies fromaround the world to illustrate the application of cultural principlesto the broad expeditionary spectrum of today and tomorrow s Ma-rine Corps combat operations,counterinsurgency,stability and re-construction operati ons,humanitarian affairs and disaster relief,andtraining and operating with foreign allies and intended for use by Marineleaders at all levels,in professional military education,planning, A.

Operational Culture for the Warfighter Principles and Applications Barak A. Salmoni Paula Holmes-Eber Foreword by General James N. Mattis, USMC Operational Culture for theWarfighter:Principles andApplications

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1 OperationalCulturefortheWarfighterPrinci ples andApplicationsBarak A. SalmoniPaula Holmes-EberForeword byGeneral James N. Mattis, USMCO perationalCulturefortheWarfighter:Princi plesandApplicationsis a comprehensive textbook, reference, and planning tool. It ad-dresses the critical need of the Marine Corps to provide operationallyrelevant cultural teaching, training, and analysis. This book links so-cial science paradigms to the needs of Marines using an applied an-thropology text links fundamental features of Culture (environment, economy, social structure, political structure and be-lief systems) to the challenges of military operations in different cul-tures around the on the research and field experiences of Marines them-selves,OperationalCulturefortheWarf ighteruses case studies fromaround the world to illustrate the application of cultural principlesto the broad expeditionary spectrum of today and tomorrow s Ma-rine Corps combat operations,counterinsurgency,stability and re-construction operati ons,humanitarian affairs and disaster relief,andtraining and operating with foreign allies and intended for use by Marineleaders at all levels,in professional military education,planning, A.

2 Salmoniis a research analyst and project leader with theRAND Corporation inWashington ,where he focuses on MiddleEast strategic issues as well as joint military training and educationfor leade r development. From 2005 to 2008 he was deputy directorof the Marine Corps Center forAdvanced Operational Culture Learn-ing. He holds a PhD in Middle Eastern Studies from Harvard Uni-versity and has taught at Harvard,the University of Pennsylvania,andthe Naval Postgraduate Holmes-Eberis professor of Operational Culture at MarineCorps University, where she teaches Culture courses for all four PMEschools. She holds a PhD in anthropology from Northwe stern Uni-versity. Previously she taught at the University of Wisconsin Mil-waukee as an assistant professor of anthropology and as a visitingscholar at the Jackson School of International Studies at the Univer-sity of and Holmes-EberOperationalCulturefortheWarfi ghterPrinciples andApplicationsMARINE CORPS UNIVERSITYQUANTICO, Holmes-EberProfessor of Operational CultureMarine Corps UniversityMarine Corps University Press3079 Moreell AvenueQuantico, Virginia22134www.

3 General James N. Mattis, of the the Problem: Irregular Warfare Significance of CultureBack to Culture in the Military and We Cross the Line of ITerms of ReferenceChapter One: Historical Approach to Culture in Conceptual Five Operational Culture Two: Defining Definitions of : An Operational Culture to Operational Culture ..43iiiPart IIFive Operational Culture Dimensions forPlanning and ExecutionChapter Three: Dimension I The Physical Culture Groups Relate to their of the Physical for ShelterClimate and SeasonsFuel and PowerChapter Four: Dimension Two The 3 Formal and Informal Economic and Services in the Informal EconomyPeople Who Participate in the Informal EconomyEconomy as a Dynamic Network of and Communal DistributionDirect Reciprocal ExchangeSymbolic Directional ExchangeEconomy as a Way of Structuring Social ProductionChapterFi ve: Dimension Three The Social Social Affecting Position Within the Social and Tribal MembershipClassEthnicity and Ethnic MembershipReligious MembershipivChapter Six: Dimension Four The Political Structures Holds Power.

4 Cultural Forms of and Informal LeadershipLeadership in Acephalous SocietiesEpisodic LeadersCouncils and OligarchiesHere ditary LeadershipDictators and StrongmenElected and Selected LeadershipConflicts Over Power: Challenges toExisting Political Seven: Dimension Five Belief Features of Belief , Imagined Memory, and FolkloreIconsSymbols and CommunicationRitualsReligious ReligionInformal ReligionPart IIIT oward Applying Operational CultureChapter Eight: From Models to Dimensions toObservable Study I Nigeria: Oil and Burgeoning Insurgency ..206 Case Study II Darfur: Environment,Economy, Ethnicity, and : Kinship Politics and the Geographic-Religious Divide ..220 Chapter Nine: Operational Culture Training and EducationInitial Issues for of Operational CultureLe arningAcross the Domains ..248 Keying Operational Culture the Appropriate DomainsProfessional Military EducationPre-Deployment TrainingMetabolizing Operational as Cultures: The Marine of Military Doctrine: Congruence withOperational Considerations are Operational Culture ThemesDoctrine Misused is Operational Culture MisconstruedAppendicesAppendix A: G lossary of B: Culture Operator s the and our allies face a complex but earnest combat will continue to demand timeless warfightingqualities of initiative, aggressiveness, combined arms skills, ethicaldecision-making, and , history tells us that a military force unwilling to change, want-ing to fight in the old-fashioned way, is doomed to defeat, regard-less of the bravery of its Marine Corps has proven to be highly adaptive.

5 During ChestyPuller s lifetime, our Corps shifted from what can be described asnaval infantry dispersed in ships detachments, to trench warfare as-sault troops, to small wars practitioners, to combined-arms am-phibious assault troops, to extended land operations alongside ourcomrades in the Army, to counterinsurgency troops always main-taining the Corps ability to defend our adaptation continued in the 1990s as Marines anticipated andprepared for the three-block wars we have been fighting in Iraqand Afghanistan since to our adaptation to today s conflict will be the intel-ligent initiative of all Marines when the enemy hides among inno-cent people. This demands a keen understanding of Culture thesort of skill practiced by Chesty and his shipmates in the jungles ofHaiti and Nicaragua when they served as advisors to , in today s information age, we must recognize thatthe esse ntial key terrain is the will of a host nation s has been demonstrated by our troops in al-Anbar, Iraq, andpermits us to gain the trust of skeptical populations, thus frustrat-ing the enemy s efforts and suffocating their superb textbook, a collaboration between our Corps Centerfor Advanced Operational Culture Learning and the Marine CorpsviiUniversity, enables today s Marines to continue their never-endingadaptation to war, keeping our Marines at the top of their game andable to confront and defeat our enemies.

6 Integrating operationalcultural principles into the specific conditions where Marines op-erate in the future will bring depth to touchstones such as No bet-ter friend, no worse enemy, and First, do no harm. Culturallysavvy Marines are a threat to our enemies, so study, challenge, andimplement the principles you study in this text. Your buddies, yourNation, and our way of life call on your ability to adapt in the finesttraditions of Chesty N. MATTISG eneral, Marine CorpsviiiAcknowledgmentsThe authors wish to acknowledge the support and encouragementof several people in the preparation ofOperational Culture for theWarfighter. These include Gen James N. Mattis, LtGen KeithStalder, LtGen Richard Zilmer, BGen James Laster, BGen JamesToolan, BGen David Garza, and Dr. Jerre Wilson. Extensive dis-cussions with LtGen Joseph Dunford, LtGen Doug Stone, MajGenMastin Robeson, BGen David Reist, BGen Michael Shupp, Crowe, Col Matthew Lopez, Col Brennan Byrne, Col GreggOlsen, Col Paul Kennedy, Col (ret.)

7 Daniel Hahne, Col (ret.) JerryDurrant, Col (ret.) Steve Fisher, LtCol (ret.) Nicholas Vukovich, LtColAthony Abati USA, LtCol Jan Horvath USA, LtCol Michael EisenstadtUSAR, Maj Seth Folsom, Maj David Vacchi USA, Maj Remi HajjarUSA, Maj Joseph Lee, Capt Matthew Danner, Capt Barrett Bradstreet,Capt Seth Moulton, Capt Jason Goodale, and MGySgt (ret.) RichardMcPherson, led to the germination of ideas that became sections ofthis book. We also acknowledge the insights of international col-leagues, to include Col Bill Monfries and LtCol Daryl Campbell,both of the Australian Army; Dr. Karen Carr, director of the UnitedKingdom Defence Academy s Centre for Human Systems; and Kirke, also at the Defence individuals read drafts of this book, providing constructivecriticism and input. These include BGen Richard Lake, Col (ret.)

8 Jeffery Bearor, Dr. Montgomery McFate, Dr. Kerry Fosher, Col (ret.)Henri Bor French Marines, LtCol Pat Carroll, and Adam Sikes, inaddition to members of the senior subject matter staff of the MAGTFS taff Training Program. We wish to acknowledge the editorial as-sistance of Wendy Overton, Dr. Patrice M. Scanlon, and Stase , as well as the stewardship of this project by the MarineCorps History Division director, Dr. Charles , we extend our gratitude to Marine Corps University and thestudents of its schools for reading and providing essential feedbackon an earlier draft ofOperational Culture for the Warfighter. Theirinsights and experiences proved fundamental to the book s know better than anyone else that the challenges of todayand tomorrow are more diverse than ever before, running thegamut from high-intensity, combined arms combat to peacekeep-ing, democracy building, and disaster relief at home and diversity of these challenges is accompanied by their simul-taneity; Marines have to deal with many different kinds of operat-ing conditions and requirements, all at the same the 1990s, Marine le aders referred to this diversity of simultane-ous actions as a three-block war.

9 1 Since then, commanders andstrategists have spoken of irregular warfare and irregular threats,to emphasize that American armed forces, and Marines in particu-lar, will confront challenges very different from the force-on-forcebattles of the twentieth the twenty-first century, formalstates and regular armies will no longer dominate armed conflict ormonopolize coercive force. Our enemies are just as likely to be in-surgents whose networks cross national boundaries; warlords whodominate portions of a country or several countries; or interna-tional drug and human trafficking cartels. Likewise our potentialpartners may include foreign militaries or police; local tribal lead-ers; or people whose long-term ideological agendas differ fromours, but whose near-term interests provide opportunities for prag-matic partnering.

10 As our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have taught us, war inthe twenty-first century will require a military that is as capa-ble of operating through successful enduring relationships withlocal sheikhs as it is at combined arms operations. Our wars willbe warsamongstthe people not warsagainstthe people, andnot warsobliviousto in the operating envi-ronments of today and tomorrow characterized by insurgenciesand political structures under threat from non-state actors longafter hostile military hardware has been destroyed, long after the high ground has been taken, Marines will continue to operatewith and around quality of our relationships with1people, in and out of uniform, is of paramount importancein determining mission a master of counterinsur-gency (COIN) theory has affirmed, the battle for the population isa major characteristic of revolutionary war [COIN].


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