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Strategic Forces James R. Schlesinger Defense …

Page 1 of 11 " Strategic Forces " James R. Schlesinger Defense department annual report washington , March 4, 1974 The Strategic Nuclear Balance, pp. 3-6 There have been two aspects in the development of Soviet Strategic Forces , one long-term and the other more recent, that affect our present Strategic Forces planning and the deterrent value of our Strategic systems. The long-term and quite well-known factor is that, over many years, the Soviets have been steadily closing the gap in nuclear capabilities between them and us. For a period of time prior to 1960, the United States had a virtual nuclear monopoly. By 1960, it was perceived that our monopoly advantage would ebb; and, in fact, it not only began to ebb, but, by 1966-67, the soviet Union had a very substantial intercontinental counter-deterrent.

Page 1 of 11 "Strategic Forces" James R. Schlesinger Defense Department Annual Report Washington, D.C. March 4, 1974 The Strategic Nuclear Balance, pp. 3-6

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Transcription of Strategic Forces James R. Schlesinger Defense …

1 Page 1 of 11 " Strategic Forces " James R. Schlesinger Defense department annual report washington , March 4, 1974 The Strategic Nuclear Balance, pp. 3-6 There have been two aspects in the development of Soviet Strategic Forces , one long-term and the other more recent, that affect our present Strategic Forces planning and the deterrent value of our Strategic systems. The long-term and quite well-known factor is that, over many years, the Soviets have been steadily closing the gap in nuclear capabilities between them and us. For a period of time prior to 1960, the United States had a virtual nuclear monopoly. By 1960, it was perceived that our monopoly advantage would ebb; and, in fact, it not only began to ebb, but, by 1966-67, the soviet Union had a very substantial intercontinental counter-deterrent.

2 During the early 1960s, it was stated quite clearly by President Kennedy--and also by a large majority of Americans in both parties--that the United States needed alternatives other than suicide or surrender, that it needed options which did not imply immediate escalation to major nuclear war. If anything, the need for options other than suicide or surrender, and other than escalation to all-out nuclear war, is more important for us today than it was in 1960, because of the growth of the capabilities possessed by other powers. These additional options do not include the option of a disarming first strike. Neither the USSR nor the United States has, or can hope to have, a capability to launch a disarming first strike against the other, since each of us possesses, and will possess for the foreseeable future, a devastating second-strike capability against the other.

3 This almost certainly will deter the deliberate initiation of a nuclear attack against cities, for it would bring inevitable retaliatory destruction to the initiator. Thus, this basic deterrent remains intact. A development of more recent years is the accelerated improvement in Soviet missile technology. The Soviet Union now has the capability in its missile Forces to undertake selective attacks against targets other than cities. This poses for us an obligation, if we are to ensure the credibility of our Strategic deterrent, to be certain that we have a comparable capability in our Strategic systems and in our targeting doctrine, and to be certain that the USSR has no misunderstanding on this point.

4 It is true that, in addition to retaliatory targeting against urban and industrial centers, our war plans have always included military targets. The purpose of having war plans whose dimensions are generally understood by potential foes is, first, to deter rash actions. But, secondly, if deterrence fails, the war plans provide the National Command Authorities--the President and his advisers--with well-though-out, detailed sets of options. Page 2 of 11 In the past, most of those options--whether the principal targets were cities, industrial facilities, or military installations--have involved relatively massive responses. Rather than massive options, we now want to provide the President with a wider set of much more selective targeting options.

5 Through possession of such a visible capability, we hope to reinforce deterrence by removing the temptation for an adversary to consider any kind of nuclear attack. Therefore, the changes we are making in our Strategic planning this year are specifically intended to shore up deterrence across the entire spectrum of risk. We believe that, by improving deterrence across the broad spectrum, we will reduce to an even lower point the probability of a nuclear clash between ourselves and other major powers. But if, for whatever reason, deterrence should fail, we want to have the planning flexibility to be able to respond selectively to the attack in such a way as to (1) limit the chances of uncontrolled escalation, and (2) hit meaningful targets with a sufficient accuracy-yield combination to destroy only the intended target and to avoid widespread collateral damage.

6 If a nuclear clash should occur--and we fervently believe that it will not--in order to protect American cities and the cities of our allies, we shall rely into the wartime period upon reserving our "assured destruction" force and persuading, through intrawar deterrence, any potential foe not to attack cities. It is through these means that we hope to prevent massive destruction even in the cataclysmic circumstances of nuclear war. This adjustment in Strategic policy does not imply major new Strategic weapon systems and expenditures. We are simply ensuring that, in our doctrine, our plans, and our command and control, we have--and are seen to have--the selectivity and flexibility to respond to aggression in an appropriate manner.

7 We do not intend that the Soviet Union should have a wider range of options than we do. Even after these adjustments to our present policy, there remains a serious potential problem for the future of our Strategic policy and Forces . In recent years, the USSR has been pursuing a vigorous Strategic R&D program. This we had expected. But its breadth, depth, and momentum as now revealed comes as something of a surprise to us. During the past year alone, the Soviets have tested four new ICBMs (the SS-X-16, SS-X-17, SS-X-18, and SS-X-19), and have developed their first MRV submarine-launched missile. The new ICBMs are of especial interest.

8 Three of the four have been flown with MIRVs, and all of them are being designed for increased accuracy. The very large SS-X-18 will have about three percent more throw-weight than the currently deployed SS-9. The SS-X-17 and SS-X-19 are considered as successors to the relatively light SS-11. They will have from three to five times the throw-weight of the earlier model SS-11s, which now constitute the bulk of the Soviet ICBM force. If all three new and heavier missiles are deployed, Soviet throw-weight in their ICBM force will increase from the current 6-7 million pounds to an impressive 10-12 million pounds. This throw-weight, combined with increased accuracy and MIRVs, could give the Soviets on the order of 7,000 one-to-two-megaton warheads in their ICBM force alone.

9 They would then possess a major one-sided counterforce capability against the United States ICBM force. This is impermissible from our point of view. There Page 3 of 11 must be essential equivalence between the Strategic Forces of the United States and the USSR--an equivalence perceived no only by ourselves, but by the Soviet Union and third audiences as well. This was the essence of the SALT I agreements. With these things in mind, we are seeking in SALT II to ensure that the principle of essential equivalence is upheld. We are also proposing in the FY 1975 budget several Strategic R&D programs conducted within the SALT I agreements as hedges against the unknown outcome of SALT II and the uncertain actions of the Soviet Union.

10 If the Soviet Union insists on moving ahead with a new set of Strategic capabilities, we will be forced to match them. We would prefer, however, to reduce the present balance in such a way that Strategic equivalence can be achieved at the lowest cost and lea st d estabilizing level of Deterrence and Assured Destruction, pp. 32-35 I frankly doubt that our thinking about deterrence and its requirements has kept pace with the evolution of [Soviet and Chinese] threats. Much of what passes as current theory wears a somewhat dated air--with its origins in the Strategic bombing campaigns of World War II and the nuclear weapons technology of an earlier era when warheads were bigger and dirtier, delivery systems considerably less accurate, and Forces much more vulnerable to surprise attack.


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