Explaining Preferences from Behavior: A Cognitive ...

1 Explaining Preferences from Behavior: A Cognitive dissonance ApproachAvidit Acharya, Stanford UniversityMatthew Blackwell, Harvard UniversityMaya Sen, Harvard UniversityThe standard approach in positive political theory posits that action choices are the consequences of Preferences . Socialpsychology in particular, Cognitive dissonance theory suggests the opposite: Preferences may themselves be affectedby action choices. We present a framework that applies this idea to three models of political choice: (1) one in whichpartisanship emerges naturally in a two-party system despite policy being multidimensional, (2) one in which interactionswith people who express different views can lead to empathetic changes in political positions, and (3) one in which ethnicor racial hostility increases after acts of violence.

2 These examples demonstrate how incorporating the insights of socialpsychology can expand the scope of formalization in political are the origins of interethnic hostility? Howdo young people become lifelong Republicans orDemocrats? What causes people to change deeplyheld political Preferences ? These questions are the bedrock ofmany inquiries within political science. Numerous articlesand books study the determinants of racism, partisanship,and preference change. Throughout, a theme linking theseseemingly disparate literatures is the formation and evolutionof political and social Preferences as an object of the empirical literature in these areas is welldeveloped, formal theories of preference change have beensubstantially more scarce in political is in partbecause much of positive political theory has focused on tra-ditional rational choice approaches, which derive the actionchoices of individuals from immutable Preferences .

3 In thisarticle, we adopt the perspective that Preferences are often theconsequenceof actions the opposite of what is posited bystandard rational choice theory. That is, actions do not nec-essarily reflect thefixed Preferences of individuals; they in-stead may be chosen for a variety of reasons, including imi-tation, experimentation, and habit. Preferences then adjust tojustify the behaviors that were framework builds on an insight originating in socialpsychology with the work of Festinger (1957) that suggeststhat actions could affect Preferences throughcognitive dis-sonance. One key aspect of Cognitive dissonance theory isthat individuals experience a mental discomfort after takingactions that appear to be in conflict with their starting pref-erences. To minimize or avoid this discomfort, they changetheir Preferences to more closely align with their show via three examples that the Cognitive dissonanceapproach can be applied to settings in politics in which in-dividuals make choices and then later change their intrinsicpreferences to be consistent with those choices.

4 Because thetheory views Preferences as the consequences of actions, theapproach is well suited to applications where actions arethe main independent variables and preference parametersare the dependent variables. Indeed, a vast subfield of politicalscience political behavior is concerned with the origins ofpartisanship, ideology, ethnic identification, and so on. Ourexamples show how the traditional rational choice approachcan be extended to provide a better understanding of thesources of these Preferences by incorporating ideas from cog-nitive dissonance Acharya is an assistant professor at Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305. Matthew Blackwell is an assistant professor at Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138. Maya Sen is an associate professor at HarvardUniversity, Cambridge, MA and supporting materials necessary to reproduce the numerical results in the article are available in theJOPD ataverse ( ).

5 An online appendix with supplementary material is available at There are some exceptions, however. We discuss these Journal of Politics, volume 80, number 2. Published online March 1, 2018. by the Southern Political Science Association. All rights reserved. 0022-3816/2018/8002-0003$ content downloaded from on September 28, 2018 07:15:59 AMAll use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions ( ).We proceed as follows. We begin by providing a concep-tual overview of our approach and by developing the basicframework. We then develop the three applications. Thefirstdemonstrates how the Cognitive dissonance approach canexplain the development of partisan affiliation. The seconddemonstrates how individuals with differing political pref-erences but who feel empathy or kinship toward one an-other find compromise by adjusting their policy third shows how Cognitive dissonance can explain theemergence and persistence of ethnic or racial hostility fromacts of violence.

6 We conclude with a discussion of other areasof politics in which these ideas may be CAN AFFECT PREFERENCESS tudies by social psychologists have documented the possi-bility that action choices affect Preferences . For example,Davis and Jones (1960) and Glass (1964) demonstrated thatindividuals are likely to lower their opinions of others whomthey are made to speak ill of or harm. They interpreted theselowered opinions as consequences of the choice to other experiments ( , Brehm 1956; Festinger 1957;Festinger and Carlsmith 1959) provide similar evidence thatmaking a choice or undertaking an action oftentimes blindlyor forcibly can lead to an increased preference over time forthe chosen alternative. The theory has been tested in exper-iments involving young children, animals, and amnesiacs (Lie-berman et al.)

7 2001), suggesting that the idea that preferencesfollow actions may be innate across species. Egan, Bloom, andSantos (2010) and Egan, Santos, and Bloom (2007), for ex-ample, showed how children and monkeys that chose a certainkind of toy or candy would then, in the next round of exper-imentation, devalue other toys or candies, even when the initialchoice was made blindly (cf. Chen and Risen 2010). In ad-dition, neurologists have documented physiological changesconsistent with subjects forming stronger commitments totheir choices after the choice has been made (Sharot, DeMartino, and Dolan 2009).Thesefindings and their interpretations contrast with thetraditional rational-choice approach. When an action thatan individual chooses, or might choose, is in conflict with theindividual s preference, rational choice theory might predictthat she will quit choosing the action or avoid it.

8 Dependingon the individual s Preferences , the assumption guiding thetraditional approach is that Preferences dictate actions, notvice versa (cf. Dietrich and List 2011, 2013). Nevertheless,our work demonstrates how the views of social psychologycan be consistent with a broader interpretation of the ra-tional choice approach and may even be considered a part ofit. We develop a framework for how a decision maker choosespreference parameters to maximize an objective function,which can be interpreted as a utility. The decision maker seeksto minimize certain costs, which happen to be psychologicalrather than material. Our model uses the language of therational choice approach maximize utility given costs to explain preference change. The result is that individualsbring their Preferences into alignment with their develop our main theoretical framework in this consider a person with a starting preference parameterxo, which isfixed.

9 There is an actionathat is taken and anew preference parameterxnthat is chosen by the choices influence two terms that we refer to as actiondissonance and preference change dissonance . Action dis-sonance is given by the functiondA(a,xn) that is increasing insome measure of the discrepancy between the actionaandthe new preference parameterxn. Preference change disso-nance is a functiondP(xn,xo) that is increasing in some mea-sure of the discrepancy between the new and old preferenceparameters,xnandxo. Total dissonance is the sum of ac-tion and preference change dissonance ,d(a;xn;xo)pdA(a;xn)1dP(xn;xo) : 1 We can think of the decision maker as seeking to maximize2d(a,xn,xo), that is, to minimize total dissonance . In thiscase, we can considerup2d(a;xn;xo) to be the decisionmaker s utility and bothaandxnto be choice variables.

10 Al-ternatively, the decision maker may choose the actionaac-cording to some behavioral rule ( , to maximize a differentobjective function) and choosexnto maximizeu. In yet an-other alternative, the action may be chosen by someone otherthan the decision maker or forced on the decision maker by athird party. Or, some components ofamay be chosen by thedecision maker while other components are chosen by all of these cases, the decision maker chooses at leastxntomaximizeu, and in this sense maximizinguis an objective ofthe decision example, on partisanship, considers a simpledecision-theoretic problem for a voter choosingaandxntominimize total dissonanced(a,xn,xo) absent any strategicconsiderations. The next example, on socialization and em-pathy, considers two individuals who each choose a com-ponent of a two-dimensionalap(a1;a2) and a new politicalviewpointxn.