Somewhat Practical Fully Homomorphic Encryption
Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) allows evaluation of arbitrary functions on encrypted data, and as such has a myriad of potential applications such as private cloud computing. Gentry [7,8] was the rst to show that FHE is theoretically possible. His construction consisted of three parts: rst, construct an encryption scheme that is
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